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TORT REFORM: THE REEMERGENCE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY
The West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance
Reform Act of 1986
I. INTRODUCTION
The erosion of sovereign immunity for local governments in the last ten years
has exposed, for the first time, the political subdivisions of West Virginia to full
liability for their torts. Alert to this potential liability, local officials routinely
purchased insurance to protect their budgets. Recently, however, these local au-
thorities have seen their insurance premiums double or even triple; some policies
have even been canceled entirely.' As justifications for their actions, insurers cite
the "litigiousness" of our society and a perceived uncertainty regarding the reg-
ulatory authority these subdivisions possess. 2
During the spring of 1986, the legislature responded to this "insurance crisis"
by enacting the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 3, which contains a
new article, the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act,3 and sev-
eral minor changes in existing code sections to harmonize them with this addition. 4
The Act attacks the crisis from two fronts. First, it seeks to limit the exposure
of political sub.divisions by restricting their liability and the amount of damages
recoverable. Second, it imposes greater regulation of rates upon the insurance
carriers.5
II. LIMITED GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
A. Political Subdivisions
At the outset, local government entities such as counties, county boards of
education, municipalities, combined city-county health departments, volunteer fire
departments, public service districts, and other bodies created to perform local
governmental functions, where their jurisdictions are coextensive with one or more
counties, cities or towns are afforded new protections. Expressly excluded are
I Frank, Cities Besieged: Shelter from Liability Sought, 71 A.B.A.J. (1985).
2 Id.; Stewart, The "Tort Reform" Hoax, 22 Trial 90 (1986).
3 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1 to -18 (Supp. 1986).
4 W. VA. CODE § 18-5-13 (1984 & Supp. 1986); W. Va. Code §§ 29-12-5 (1980 & Supp. 1986),
29-12-5a (1980 & Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-14a (1982 & Supp. 1986).
' W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1.
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hospitals of these entities. 6 Thus defined, political subdivisions are given immunity
from liability for injury or death to persons or property except for actions brought
in five broad categories: (1) injuries resulting from the negligent operation of
vehicles by employees within the scope of their employment; (2) injuries resulting
from the negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their employment;
(3) injuries caused by the negligent maintenance of roads, sidewalks, bridges, or
public grounds, except where a municipality has no responsibility to inspect or
repair a bridge within its limits; (4) those injuries resulting from the negligence
of employees on or within the grounds of buildings used by the subdivision,
excepting jails and other places of detention; and (5) where liability is expressly
imposed by a provision of the Code.7 This last area includes only express im-
positions of liability and not Code provisions which impose merely a duty on the
subdivision or which provide generally that a subdivision may sue and be sued.'
The Act proceeds immediately to riddle these five areas with exceptions. Sub-
divisions are granted immunity from liability for legislative functions, judicial or
prosecutorial functions, a broad range of executive functions, natural conditions
on improved public property other than those affirmatively caused by the neg-
ligence of the subdivision, natural conditions on unimproved property, claims
covered under worker's compensation, unintentional misrepresentations, products
liability or breach of warranty of fitness for a specific purpose, operation of
dumps, and operation of prisons, including injuries resulting from the escape of
prisoners.9 In addition, employees of political subdivisions are given immunity
from liability unless the acts fall manifestly outside the scope of their employment,
are done with malicious purpose, in bad faith, wantonly or recklessly, or where
liability is expressly extended to employees by a provision of the Code.'0
This reestablishment of limited sovereign immunity for local governments is
the Act's most important effect. The doctrine of local sovereign immunity had
been abolished in a series of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decisions:
Long v. City of Weirton" (municipalities), Gooden v. County Commission of
Webster County2 (counties), and Ohio Valley Contractors v. Board of Education
of Wetzel County3 (county boards of education).
The origin of the common-law immunity of local governments was a well-
known misunderstanding of a 1788 English case, Russell v. Men of Devon.14 In
6 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3(c).
7 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-4(c).
8 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-4(c)(5).
9 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a).
V W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(b).
11 Long v. City of Weirton, 158 W. Va. 741, 214 S.E.2d 832 (1975).
2 Gooden v. Webster County Conim'n., 298 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1982).
Ohio Valley Contractors v. Wetzel County Bd. of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437 (XV. Va. 1982).
" Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
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that case no governmental entity was sued; the defendant was the population at
large. The concern of the court was that there was no treasury from which the
judgment could be paid, not that a public treasury would be called upon to pay
it. Despite subsequent English authority clarifying and properly applying Russell, 5
the leading American cases, Mower v. Leicester 6 and Bailey v. The Mayor of
New York,17 had already engrained the error in American common law. 8
The immunity created was not absolute. In most jurisdictions, including West
Virginia, an odd dichotomy developed between "governmental" functions, for
which local governments could not be held liable, and "proprietary" functions,
for which they could. If a function was not "strictly necessary" for the govern-
ment to perform, it was proprietary. Aside from giving local governments little
incentive to expand the range of services offered their citizens, practice caused
a function once held proprietary to become governmental. Among services once
held proprietary by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals were the main-
tenance of a waterworks system for domestic use 9 and the quarrying incident to
street repairs. 20 Citing the unworkable nature of the standard, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals abandoned it along with municipal immunity.2'
The Act reestablished a comparable dichotomy. Most of the immunities granted
in the act are clearly "governmental," e.g., legislative, judicial, licensing and penal
powers. Others, however, are less clear, e.g., natural conditions on unimproved
subdivision property, ice and snow, and products liability. Despite the broad lan-
guage used in immunizing "legislative" functions and the like, the finite list of
immunities should prove far more workable than the old "governmental-pro-
prietary" test.?
Actions brought under the.Act are subject to the general two-year statute of
limitations with the discovery rule tolling until the injury is or should be dis-
covered.? There is, however, an important deviation where the action is brought
15 Mayor of Lyme Regis v. Henley, 110 Eng. Rep. 29 (1832), aff'd 6 Eng. Rep. 1180 (House
of Lords, 1834); See discussion in Long, 158 W. Va. at 769-73, 214 S.E.2d at 851.853.
16 Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
'7 Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
s For example, the "doctrine" was adopted by our mother state of Virginia shortly after the
division of the State. Richmond v. Long's Adm'rs, 58 Va. (17 Grat.) 375 (1867), overruled, First
Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 (1983); See Long, 158 W. Va. at 773,
214 S.E.2d at 853.
19 igal v. Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S.E. 554 (1914).
20 Harrison v. McOwen, 126 W. Va. 933, 30 S.E.2d 740 (1944). The maintenance of streets,
however, was "governmental." Morgan v. Logan, 125 W. Va. 445, 24 .E.2d .760 (1943).
21 Long, 158 W. Va. at 78485, 214 S.E.2d at 859-860.
z, The old rule frequently led to some bizarre precedent. The operation of a municipal airport
was "governmental," Van Gilder v. Morgantown, 136 W. Va. 831, 68 S.E.2d 746 (1949), but operating
a municipal park was "proprietary." Warden v. Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375 (1925). See
supra note 19 and accompanying texi.
2 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(a).
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for injuries to a minor. Actions for injuries to children under ten years of age
must be brought within two years or prior to the child's twelfth birthday, which-
ever is longer.2 The two years would of course only be longer where the injury
was suffered before the tenth birthday but discovered afterwards. Another sub-
section further tolls the statute whenever the subdivision commits fraud or col-
lusion in concealing necessary facts.25
The tolling of the statute for both the discovery rule and where the tortfeasor
has withheld information is consistent with prior law. In its treatment of injuries
to minors, however, the Act diverges from past practice. In general, the statute
of limitations is tolled by the disability of minority, and will not begin to run
until that disability disappears. 27 The effect of the Act is to start the running of
the statute as early as the minor's tenth birthday rather than at his majority. 2
B. Damage Awards
Possibly the most significant procedural change under the Act is the prohi-
bition against demands for specific amounts of monetary damages in the com-
plaint. Plaintiffs may take demand only for such damages as the trier of fact
deems appropriate. 29 This provision obviously contravenes the law applicable to
actions in general, as Rule 8(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
requires a "demand for judgment for the relief to which he (the plaintiff) deems
himself entitled." Whether this will achieve the apparent goal of lowering awards
remains to be seen.
Regardless, awards will doubtless be reduced by the Act's direct limitations.
First, the Act forbids recovery of punitive or exemplary damages against a sub-
division. 0 These were previously recoverable.3 1 While no restriction is placed upon
amounts recoverable as compensatory damages, noneconomic losses may not be
awarded in excess of five hundred thousand dollars. 2 Second, a subdivision's
24W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(b).
" W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(c).
2 For cases expounding the discovery rule see Harrison v. Seltzer, 165 W. Va. 366, 268 S.E.2d
312 (1980); Hill v. Clarke, 161 W. Va. 258, 241 S.E.2d 572 (1978); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc.,
149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965); and Petrelli v. West Virginia Pittsburgh Coal Co., 86 W.
Va. 607, 104 S.E. 103 (1920). W. VA. CODE § 55-2-17 (1981) tolls the statute where the tortfeasor
fraudulently conceals. For applications see Cameron v. Cameron, 111 W. Va. 375, 162 S.E. 173
(1931); Reynolds v. Gawthrop, 37 W. Va. 3, 16 S.E. 364 (1892); Vanbibber v. Beirne, 6 W. Va. 168
(1873); Duttine v. Savas, 455 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. W. Va. 1978), aff'd 612 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1979).
" W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15 (1981).
2 See W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(b).
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(d).
" W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7(a).
11 Long, 158 W. Va. 741, 214 S.E.2d 832; Bond v. City of Huntington, 276 S.E.2d 539 (W.
Va. 1981).
32 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7(b).
1987]
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liability as the "deep pocket" among joint tortfeasors is limited. Where a jury
attributes less than twenty-five per cent of the liability for the injury to a tortfeasor
in an action covered by the Act, that tortfeasor has only several, but not joint
liability.33 Subdivisions thereby avoid being "stuck" by judgment-proof co-defend-
ants. This of course modifies the common-law rule that each joint tortfeasor is
liable for the whole, regardless of his relative fault, with only a right of con-
tribution after excess payment.14 Further, no right of contribution exists against
a joint tortfeasor who enters into a good-faith settlement before the jury's or
court's findings, which allows a subdivision to settle claims without fear of in-
curring further liability.35 This reflects the prevailing rule. 6 No action or appeal
is permitted by a taxpayer or anyone else with respect to a settlement thus entered
by a political subdivision. 7
C. Other Matters
The Act generally leaves payment of claims by insurers to the terms of the
particular contract of insurance. It does, however, forbid an insurer from entering
into a settlement exceeding policy limits, and gives the subdivision a right of
indemnity against the insurer to the policy limit.3 Subdivisions also need not fear
that their funds or property will be the subject of execution.39 Only funds spe-
cifically appropriated for the payment of judgments may be used for that pur-
pose. 4° The old rule permitted execution upon property or funds not devoted to
essential government services.4' Clearly, a rule which protects these basic structures
from liquidation to satisfy a judgment is a matter of necessity. The Act goes
further and protects all property and funds of the subdivision except those devoted
to paying judgments. If the funds available are insufficient, the fiscal officier of
the subdivision must certify the amount owed to the appropriate taxing authority
for inclusion in the budget of the next fiscal year, which tempers the new shields
with consideration for the injured party.42 In the case of insurance carriers, how-
ever, holders of judgments may proceed in any manner allowed by law. 43
33 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7(d).
34 Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979) (joint and several
liability). W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1981) gives right of contribution, which is based upon each tort-
feasor's pro rata comparative fault. Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W. Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d
679 (1982).
"' Cf. W. VA. CODE §§ 29-12A-7(e),-(f), 29-12A-11(b)(1).
6 Tennant v. Craig, 156 W. Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973); See also W. VA. CODE § 55-7-
12 (1981) (release of one tortfeasor no bar to suit against others).
31 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-11(b)(2).
3' W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-9.
3' W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-10(a).
' "W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-10(b).
" Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 (1879).
' 2 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-10(b).
S W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-10(c).
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Employees and officers of subdivisions are given extensive shields against
liablity. In addition to sharing the subdivision's various immunities, the entity
must provide for the employee's defense in any action in which the acts of the
employee giving rise to the suit are not manifestly outside the scope of his em-
ployment, except where the action is brought by a political subdivision." Sub-
divisions must also indemnify their employees for any liability the employee is
exposed to by acts within the scope of his employment. 45 If, on the other hand,
it is later shown that the employee was, after all, acting without the scope of his
employment, the subdivision has a right of indemnity. 46 This should eliminate the
unfortunate situation in which a city councilman or county commissioner is forced
to resign because of his inability to insure himself against liability. 47
III. REGULATION OF INSURERS
The second arm of the Act provides for more strict regulation of insurance
rates. Insurance in effect as of the effective date of the article (June 1, 1986)
cannot be reduced except by consent of the insured, and increases in premiums
are limited to less than ten per cent per annum.48 Additionally, such policies cannot
be canceled unless the subdivision has failed to pay premiums, has committed
fraud in the procurement of the policy, or has exposed the insurer to a substantial
increase in exposure to loss. 49 An insurer who wishes to increase its rates must
file with the insurance commissioner any information the commissioner requires
to determine the profitability of the insurer's business, whereupon the commis-
sioner may approve or disapprove the requested increase. 0
These limitations do not revolutionize policy cancellation. Cancellation of
policies is usually left to the terms of the contract.51 Failure to pay premiums is
clearly a breach of contract which would relieve the insurer from liability in any
event, and fraud in the inducement of an insurance policy has long been held to
invalidate the same.5 2 Moreover, the provisions allowing cancellation for sub-
stantial increase in the risk of loss reflects at least the stated reason insurers have
given for cancelling policies during the recent "crisis." 53 Finally, a strict reading
" W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-11(a)(1).
41 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-12.
6 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-11(a)(2).
47 Compare the general rule which imposes liability on both master and servant. Robertson v.
LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563 (%V. Va. 1983); REsrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
41 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-17(a).
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-17(a)(1) to -(3).
Wo . VA. CODE § 29-12A-17(b).
, Absent statutory limitation. 10A MIcHm's JuR. Insurance § 27 (1977). In key areas, the
Legislature has seen fit to prescribe the conditions for cancellation. E.g. W. VA. CODE § 33-6A-1 to
-5 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (cancellation of automobile insurance policies).
12 Jarvis v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co., 129 W. Va. 291, 40 S.E.2d 308 (1946); Federal Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Deal, 239 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. W. Va. 1965).
" See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text.
1987]
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of the subsection involved reveals that only those policies in effect on the effective
date of the article, (i.e. June 1, 1986) are involvedm Consequently, the provision
should eventually die of attrition, leaving insurers free to cancel policies according
to any contract provision they may develop. Even as to those policies clearly
under the subsection, the change from prior practice is mild. Subdivisions gain
probably little added protection from this subsection.
The subdivisions themselves are given broad leeway in insuring themselves
against liability. They may self-insure, contract with other persons or subdivisions
to provide for self-insurance, or purchase liability insurance.15 If they choose the
group self-insurance option, they may provide for joint administration of such
a program, and do not thereby waive any of the immunities given them by the
article.5 6 If a subdivision chooses to buy liability insurance, it may opt to obtain
it through the State Board of Risk and Insurance Management. 7
The subsection requiring an insurer to submit proposed fee changes and in-
formation as to the insurer's profitability to the insurance commissioner does,
however, provide the State a mechanism to protect its subdivisions from prof-
iteering. The new powers granted subdivisions to self-insure and pool their re-
sources to either self-insure or buy liability insurance should also help divisions
budget potential liability.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
Finally, the article deals with several miscellaneous matters. 8 Venue for ac-
tions under the article lies in the county where such political subdivision is located
or where the cause of action arose. 9 The plaintiff must be a real party in interest;
no claim is permitted under a right of subrogation.60 The defendant is to be the
political subdivision, and employees acting within the scope of their duties are
not to be made defendants. 61 The Act is not retroactive to those actions which
4 The subsection reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Liability insurance coverage for political subdivisions in effect on the effective
date of this article [June 1, 1986] shall not be reduced without the written consent of the
insured and the policy premiums for such coverage shall not be increased by more than
ten percent per annum. Such coverage shall not be cancelled except for .... W. VA. CODE
§ 29-12A-17(a).
S W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-16.
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-16(e).
W . VA. CODE § 29-12A-16(a).
With one possible exception, the provisions of the Act are consistent with one another. W.
VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(5) prescribes immunity from liability for civil insurrection, riot, insurrection,
or the method of, or failure to provide, police protection. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-4(5) provides for
liability where it is imposed by another section of the code. W. VA. CODE § 61-6-12 (1984) imposes
liability on counties for failure to prevent a lynching.
'9 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-13(a).
6' W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-13(c).
61 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-13(b).
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accrued prior to June 1, 1986, and is wholly inapplicable to actions in contract,
by sureties under surety bonds, those brought under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and those involving certain labor disputes between the sub-
division and its employees.Y
The entire bill contains several minor changes in other code sections. These
either delete provisions requiring insurers to waive assertions of governmental
immunity or insert provisions allowing them to assert the statutory immunity
created by the Act.63 In addition, one change allows the Board of Risk and In-
surance Management to provide coverage to subdivisions.64
V. CONCLUSION
Was the enactment of this legislation the most prudent means of confronting
the insurance "crisis?" In order to answer in the affirmative, it is at least necessary
to show that the causes of the crisis were those identified by the insurance com-
panies: the "litigiousness" of our society and the risk of enormous verdicts.6 5 In
a recent study, Professor Marc Galanter concluded that the notion that ours is
a litigious society is supported by only anecdotal evidence, and that our society
compares favorably with other industrial nations in our resort to the courts. 66
Other studies have found a similar lack of empirical support for the idea.67
Nor does it appear that the insurance industry is on the verge of collapse.
The total return on the net worth of the industry has not once shown a loss for
any year in recent memory.68 Profits dipped drastically in the early 1980s, but a
close examination shows that the drop was the result of irresponsible slashing of
rates during theboom years of the late seventies.6 9
62 w. VA. CODE §§ 29-12A-15, 29-12A-18.
6 W. VA. CODE §§ 18-5-13 (1984 & Supp. 1986), 29-12-5a (each deletes requirement that insurers
of county boards of education waive board's immunity); W. VA. CODE § 29-12-5 (grants insurer right
to rely upon statutory immunity of political subdivisions); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-14a (deletes reference
to governmental subdivisions in section requiring insurers to waive immunity of charitable organi-
zations).
"XV. VA. CODE § 29-12-5(b).
65 See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text.
66M. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigation Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4
(1983).
67 From 1980 through 1985, tort cases in federal courts increased at an annual rate of 4.6%.
During the same period, other civil litigation rose at an annual rate of 11.7%. Between 1981 and
1984, verdicts in medical malpractice cases increased at an annual rate of 3.974, well below the
corresponding increase in health-care costs (11.8%), Stewart, supra note 2, at 91 (citing ADrnNIs-
TRATwE OFFICE U.S. COURTs, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR A-16 (1980); ADrmuzsRAmrvE OFFICE,
U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DiREJTOR A-6 (1985); P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SE-
vERItY OF MEDICAL MALPRACT E C_.mis 6 (1982) (Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corp.)).
63 See Stewart, supra note 2, at 93, Chart 1.
69 Id. at 92.
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The Act does address the insurance companies by requiring them to justify
raising rates to subdivisions. In its reestablishment of limited sovereign immunity
however, it has cut off the head to cure the headache. Why should not the public
at large pay (through taxes) for the torts of its governmental entities? Sovereign
immunity makes no more sense now than it did when abrogated by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The Act ignores the fact that jurors are
taxpayers, and when and if those taxpayers reach the limit of their ability to
finance this liability, their attitudes will adjust and verdicts will stabilize. 70 This
internal control has been the ultimate force behind all changes in the tort system
since its beginnings somewhere in the dim past.7' We should trust it now.
The best reason, however, for not excepting political subdivisions from tort
liability is found in the opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
in Long: "[O]ne does not know whether he will have to suffer harm without
recompense or whether he will be adequately compensated for the damage done
him since he does not 'choose' his tort-feasor. ' '7
Let us all hope we are lucky enough not to be "chosen" by our political
subdivisions.
Johnny M. Knisely, 11
70 A new statute, however, makes it less likely that a person will serve as a juror in a case
against a political subdivision in which he resides. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-13 (Supp. 1986).
71 Stewart, supra note 2, at 90; See, generally W. KEETON, D. DoBBs, R. KEETON, & D. OwEN,
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 3 ( 5th Ed., 1984).
7 Long, 158 W. Va. at 782, 214 S.E.2d at 858.
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